Presidential Power and Aggression Abroad: A Constitutional Dilemma by Schwarzer, William W. & Wood, Robert R.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
1954
Presidential Power and Aggression Abroad: A
Constitutional Dilemma
William W. Schwarzer
UC Hastings College of the Law, schwarzw@uchastings.edu
Robert R. Wood
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation




UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Author: William W. Schwarzer
Title: Presidential Power and Aggression Abroad: A Constitutional Dilemma
Source: American Bar Association Journal
Citation: 40 A.B.A. J. 394 (1954).
Originally published in the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL. This information or any 
portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or 
downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express 
written consent of the American Bar Association.
Schwarzer William
Presidential Power and Aggression Abroad:
A Constitutional Dilemma
by William W. Schwarzer and Robert R. Wood * of the California Bar (San Francisco)
* Although the constitutional power to declare war is vested in Congress, congres-
sional declarations have had surprisingly little to do in the past with committing our
Armed Forces to actions that look and sound very much like war. The President is
the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and most of the hostilities we have
engaged in have actually begun before any formal action of the legislative branch.
• If Russian troops should suddenly
invade Norway, the universal ques-
tion would be: What will America
do? All members of NATO, includ-
ing Norway, have received the sol-
emn pledge of the United States
that an attack on one would be
regarded as an attack on all. Each
member of NATO vowed to assist
the nation attacked by taking forth-
with such action as it deemed neces-
sary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.'
What action does American gov-
ernmental machinery permit in such
an event? Normally the President is
the one to decide what military meas-
ures are necessary. Suppose he decides
that the safety of America depends
upon immediate military action to
prevent strategic Norwegian bases
from falling into Russian hands.
Suppose he decides that the safety of
America depends on instant massive
retaliation. Still, crisis or not, he
must consider a f[rther problem:
What does the Constitution author-
ize the President to do under the cir-
cumstances? Oddly enough, this vital
394 American Bar Association Journal
question of constitutional law is
fraught with such doubt and dif-
ficulty that the foremost legal author-
ities reach opposite conclusions.
This problem-the constitutional
power of the President to send troops
into action abroad-may confront us
anywhere, anytime in our troubled
world. It has arisen in the past, as in
the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, but
was not seriously debated until after
President Truman had sent our
troops to fight the North Koreans.
The issue of the debate, of course,
was whether the President should
have waited to let Congress vote on
what measures were to be taken
against the North Koreans, who
meanwhile were sweeping southward.
The great constitutional question
stems from the division of the war
power by the Founding Fathers be-
tween Congress and the President.
The framers of the Constitution,
with the hated prerogatives of George
III in mind, did not want the new
republic's Chief Executive to possess
the grave power of choosing between
war and peace. Congress, instead,
would "declare" war and the Presi-
dent was made Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy to act as the
nation's first general and admiral.
Thomas Jefferson thought that "we
have already given . . . one effectual
check to the dog of war, by trans-
ferring the power of letting him
loose . . . from those who are to
spend to those who are to pay".
2
Originally the framers had given
Congress the power to "make" war.
But even in 1787, war could come
too fast for Congress to act to defend
the nation, and a change was made to
give Congress the power to "declare"
war in order to remove any doubts
that the President could "make" war
in defense of the nation.3 In the
twenty-third of The Federalist pa-
pers, Alexander Hamilton justified
this change by maintaining that the
circumstances that endangered the
safety of nations were infinite and no
constitutional shackles could wisely
be imposed on the President's power
of defense; that it was impossible
to foresee the extent and variety of
means that would be necessary to
insure adequate defense in the fu-
ture. Hamilton's authoritative in-
terpretation of the Constitution
demonstrates the great foresight and
1. The North Atlantic Treaty, Artcle V, 63 Stat.
pt. 2, page 2244.
2. Quoted in Warren, The Maktig of the Con-
stitiion (1928), 481 note 1.
3. 2 Forrand, Records of the Federal Conven-
tion of 1787 (1911), 318.
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statesmanship of our Founding Fa-
thers.4
But the Founding Fathers could
not foresee supersonic aircraft and
hydrogen bombs which today raise
the momentous constitutional ques-
tion: When is American resistance to
aggression abroad "war" which Con-
gress must declare and when is it
"defense" which the President may
undertake? An attack on Hawaii
clearly permits the President to
plunge the nation into all-out mo-
bilization and to commit its Armed
Forces to action. But what about an
attack .on Canada, or on Cuba, or
on Indo-China or on Norway? Are
these, too, the ramparts of our de-
fense?
An attack on any of these nations
would confront the United States
with a national emergency but the
degree of its seriousness would vary
with each case. Who is to decide the
question of degree, the question
whether the emergency is serious
enough to justify presidential action?
The United States Supreme Court in
the Steel Seizure case held that
the President may not enlarge
his powers at the expense of Congress
by simply deciding that a national
emergency exists.5 When President
Polk seemed to do just that by dis-
patching American troops into Mex-
ico, Abraham Lincoln scoffed:6
If today he should choose to say he
thinks it necessary to invade Canada
to prevent the British from invading
us, how could you stop him? You may
say to him, "I see no probability of the
British invading us," but he will say
to you, "Be silent; I see it, if you
don't."
It may be significant that when
Lincoln later assumed the awful re-
sponsibility of defending the nation,
he thought it necessary to assume
unprecedented - even dictatorial -
powers for the first three months
following the fall of Fort Sumter.
In deciding what to do in the event
of an attack on a country such as
Norway, the President must examine
with deep insight this nation's his-
tory and its principles of govern-
ment. It is our thesis that these will
provide constitutional means for tak-
ing military action when sudden
swift aggression makes it imperative.
A survey of American wars shows,
surprisingly, that congressional dec-
larations of war have had little or
nothing to do with committing this
nation's Armed Forces. Only the War
of 1812 followed congressional de-
bate culminating in a declaration of
war. In every other instance Con-
gress followed presidential leader-
ship by declaring war or supporting
undeclared war such as the naval
war against France in 1798, the
Barbary wars in 1801 and 1815, the
Mexican hostilities from 1914 to
1916, and the Korean war. Although
a declaration of war has a major legal
significance in our relations with
enemy nations and as a basis for
emergency legislation, it has had lit-
tle to do with "letting loose the dog
of war".
7
Over a hundred times the Presi-
dent has sent American forces abroad
into action too limited to be called
war.8 In Latin-America, the Philip-
pines, Japan, China, Russia and
other countries these forces have
been used to guard American lives
and property. At times the President
has acted similarly to enforce inter-
national obligations or to protect
the intangible interests of the United
States. The occupation of Haiti, the
assumption of control over the Canal
Zone, President Monroe's declaration
of the Western Hemisphere's ter-
ritorial integrity, the destroyers-for-
bases deal-all were examples of how
Presidents have unilaterally com-
mitted American military force in
the interest of national security as
they saw it.
It is also relevant here that the
4. For a recent statement, see Mr. Justice
Jackson, concurring, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co., et ol. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952);
see also id. at page 659.
5. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., et at. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 1952).
6. Quoted in Taft, A Foreign Policy for Ameri-
cans 11951), 29.
7. A concise survey of Congress' use of its
power to declare war is found in Rogers, World
Policing and the Constitution [19451, 45-55.
8. Rogers, supra, cites 148 instances; 76 in-
stances are listed in Offutt, The Protection of
Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the
United States (1928). The difference seems due to
different criteria of selection.
Constitution makes the President the
Chief Executive, the chief enforce-
ment officer of the nation's laws.
This presidential function affects our
problem in two ways. In the first
place we have since the end of
World War II built a formidable
network of collective security treaties
covering most of the free world. The
outstanding example is the North
Atlantic Treaty in which the signa-
tory powers "agree that an armed at-
tack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them
all". 9 While the Senate in ratifying
this treaty did not intend to relin-
quish the congressional power to
declare war-even if it could have
done so-this treaty certainly imposes
a legal obligation on the President in
the event of an armed attack on a
member nation. Being the law of the
land, it would require him to enforce
it by such action as the Constitution
authorizes. Secondly there exists to-
day something in the nature of an
international common law by which
aggressive war is made illegal. Over
a period of centuries the collective
morality of the peoples of the world
has crystallized into such legal forms
as the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlaw-
ing war and the recent trials of war
criminals. There is increasing rec-
ognition today of a civilized nation's
duty to act as a citizen policeman in
defending society against aggressive
war. This principle has found expres-
sion in the Charter and the conduct
of the United Nations. 0
The President's role cannot, of
course, be conclusively defined by
international law and the course of
history. Neither the development of
9. The North Atlantic Treaty, Article V, 63 Stat.
pt. 2, page 2244.
10. A discussion of the status of war in modern
international low is found in Jessup, "Force
Under a Modern Low", 25 Foreign Aflairs 90
(October, 1946). The Senate Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the House Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, in approving the United Nations Portici-
potion Act of 1945, both stated that American
participation in international policing under Ar-
ticle 43 of the U.N. Charter would not be "war"
in the constitutional sense which requires a
declaration by Congress. Sen. Rep. No. 717, page
8, and H. R. Rep. No. 1383, page 8, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945). An authoritative contrary view is
expressed in Borchard, "The Charter and the
Constitution," 39 Am. J. Intl. L. 767 (1945).
May, 1954 * Vol. 40 395
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international morality nor the as-
sumption of international obliga-
tions can alter the distribution of
power in American government.
Neither the jetplane, the atom bomb
nor the peril of friends abroad is
capable of amending our Constitu-
tion. Yet the essential truth remains
that the Constitution was not drafted
as a statute to deal with the problems
of Hamilton's and Jefferson's day
but as an enduring charter of gov-
ernment.
The system of government be-
qjueathed to us is, like all democratic
institutions, a compromise. The
Founding Fathers divided the power
to conduct our foreign affairs, in
peace as in war, between Congress
and the President. Since that day,
the demands of responsible demo-
cratic government have had to be
adjusted to the moment's needs for
prompt and resolute action. The ac-
cumulated experience of history has
therefore put a gloss on the consti-
tutional framework." Unilateral
presidential action within certain
spheres has become a part of con-
stitutional government. Even in the
legislative branch power and respon-
sibility have crystallized in commit-
tees and chairmen.
What would a President, con-
fronted with a sudden attack on a
friendly nation abroad, face when
he turns to Congress for authority
to take action? Even if a majority
were willing to follow his leadership
and accept his judgment based on
information and experience not in-
mediately available to Congress,
there would undoubtedly be an intel-
ligent and powerful minority that
should and would be heard. The
probable debate between representa-
tives from rural and interior con-
stituencies and those from areas more
responsive to events abroad might
cost strategic days and hours.
Against the delays of congressional
debate must be weighed the organ-
ization, the skill and the information
of the executive branch which make
it peculiarly qualified to act when
quick action is needed. But presi-
dential power to act depends on the
existence of a sufficiently grave emer-
396 American Bar Association Journal
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gency and, as we have seen, it is not
within his power to determine that
such an emergency exists.
Yet it is clear that the President,
sworn to defend the nation and the
Constitution, cannot refuse to act
when national security is threat-
ened.12 An attack on New York
would raise no question respecting
his constitutional powers. An attack
on Canada or Cuba would raise very
little question. An attack on a Euro-
pean ally would have this in common
with an attack on or near this coun-
try-it would impose on the President
the same duty to exercise his best
judgment on the matter of the de-
fense of this country. The President,
after all, is elected as much for his
ability to exercise his judgment and
make decisions for the nation as for
his ability to carry out the mandate
of Congress. If his judgment dictates
that the safety of the country is
threatened and that quick action is
needed to eventually save American
lives, it is his duty to take appropri-
ate action immediately whether the
attack is against American territory
or not.
Many times in our early history,
the President or his executive officers
Kee Coleman studios
William W. Schwarzer was graduated
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have had to act in the best interests
of the nation when there was no time
to go to Congress for authority.'3
The ultimate legality of their con-
duct depended on eventual congres-
sional approval but this did not
diminish their duty to act when
circumstances demanded action. Jef-
ferson's purchase of the Louisiana
territory is an example. A firm
believer in a weak executive, he
nevertheless felt that it was his duty
to secure to the American people the
immeasurable benefits accruing from
the purchase regardless of his doubts
respecting his power to act.1 4 Con-
gress subsequently approved his ac-
tion and history vindicated his judg-
ment. There are other occasions on
which executive officers have had to
act promptly to spend money, dis-
11. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., et a/. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952).
12. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862).
(The Court states, however, that the President
does not have the power to vinitiate" war).
13. See Wilmerding, "The President and the
Law', 67 Pal. Sci. Q. 321 (September, 1952).
14. Interesting examples of Jefferson's thinking
in connection with the Presidents power and
duty to act in emergencies are found in Franklin,
"War Powers of the President: An Historical Justi-
fication of Mr. Roosevelt's Message of September
7, 1942", 17 Tulane L. Rey. 217, 231-240 (1942).
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tribute supplies or suspend habeas
corpus and ask congressional ap-
proval only afterward.
When the President's duty to act
in the defense of the best interests
of the country as they appear to him
is viewed in the light of the historic
development of his office and of the
international obligations which the
nation has assumed, some of the
doubts surrounding his power to
resist aggression abroad disappear. If
imperious circumstances demand ac-
tion, it is not the President's duty
to refuse to act while awaiting specif-
ic authority from Congress. Aware
of the electorate's confidence in his
judgment, he must proceed to exer-
National Conference
0 The seventh meeting of the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Presidents
was held at the Atlanta Biltmore
Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia, on Sunday,
March 7, 1954. Considering the geo-
graphical location of Atlanta, the
meeting was unusually well attended.
The total registration was ninety-
four-representing fifty bar associa-
tions and thirty-two states. We were
pleased to have two representatives
who traveled all the way from
Hawaii.
Confined as we were to a one-day
session, our program was rather con-
gested and unfortunately little time
was left for question-box periods and
general discussion. We were ad-
dressed by several bar presidents who
discussed "Significant Undertakings
and Accomplishments of Our Bar As-
sociation". These were Glenn R.
Jack, President of the Oregon State
Bar, Edward A. Dutton, President
of the Georgia Bar Association, Ed-
ward T. Curry, President of the New
Jersey State Bar Association, G. Ellis
Gable, President of the Oklahoma
Bar Association, Gabriel Hoffenberg,
Past President of the Beverly Hills
Bar Association, California, Timothy
I. McKnight, President of the Illi-
nois State Bar Association, Bettin
Stalling, President of the Federal
Bar Association and Stanley B. Bal-
bach, Vice Chairman of the Junior
cise it in the realization that Con-
gress nlnsi eventually be asked to
supply the authority which lie may
lack at the time he takes the
action he considers imperative. Faced
with an attack on Norway, for ex-
ample, the President may well con-
clude, especially in view of the Sen-
ate's recognition of Norway's strate-
gic importance by the North Atlantic
Treaty, that immediate military in-
tervention is imperative. An attack
on other countries with whom we
may have different ties or none at all
may equally lead him to determine
that immediate intervention by our
Armed Forces is needed, and he must
of Bar Presidents
Bar Conference of the American Bar
Association.
Perhaps the highlight of the Con-
ference was a television show en-
titled, "The Law Says", put on by
the Atlanta Bar Association and the
Lawyers Club of Atlanta. This was
a departure from the talks we have
had on public relations and showed
public relations in action.
We were welcomed by an interest-
ing talk by A. Walton Noll, President
of the Atlanta Bar Association. We
xeceived not only the Southern hos-
pitality which he promised us, but
Southern hospitality at its best.
In addition to committee reports,
we were addressed by William J.
Jameson, President of the American
Bar Association Sidney B. Pfeifer, of
Buffalo, New York, President of the
Erie County Bar Association; Jo V.
Morgan, Judge of Municipal Court,
Washington, D. C.; Ross L. Malone,
Jr., of Roswell, New Mexico, mem-
ber of the Board of Governors of the
American Bar Association; Joseph
B. Miller, chairman of the National
Conference of Bar Secretaries; Harry
Gershenson, of St. Louis, Missouri,
Chairman of the American Bar As-
sociation's Section of Bar Activities;
Glenn R. Winters, Executive Sec-
retary of The American Judicature
Society; E. Smythe Gambrell, Chair-
man of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on Regional Meet-
then act accordingly and submit his
decision to Congress as soon as time
permits. Congress retains the ulti-
mate power to overrule the Presi-
dent's decision by withholding funds
or by refusing to declare war. Admit-
tedly it would not be easy for Con-
gress to extricate the country from
a war in progress but this risk is
outweighed by the dangers of inac-
tion in time of peril. And even if
Congress should fail to back a Pres-
ident's decision, he will have been
no more delinquent in the perform-
ance of his constitutional duty than
if he had permitted the nation to
be thrown into mortal peril by re-
fusing to take action.
ings; and Allen L. Oliver, Chair-
man of the Association's Committee
on Unemployment and Social Secu-
rity.
There still seems to be some con-
fusion as to who are members of and
who may attend the Conference. I
quote from my letter of October 21,
1953: "The Conference is composed
of the President of the American
Bar Association, the Presidents, Pres-
idents-elect, Vice Presidents, and of-
ficers of all state and local bar as-
sociations which are represented in
the House of Delegates of the Amer-
ican Bar Association and the Presi-
dents of all other local bar associa-
tions in the United States as associate
members. The past presidents of
these associations are also members
and constitute a most valued alum-
ni."
Perhaps the most important meet-
ing which this Conference has yet
held will be held at the time of the
Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association in Chicago on August
16-20, 1954. At that time the new
American Bar Center will be dedi-
cated. There will be a meeting of
the Conference Council on Saturday
morning, August 14. Our alert Vice
Chairman, Archibald M. Mull, Jr.,
of Sacramento, California, will be in
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